[v][1] Moreover, whoever has the good of the community as his goal has the achievement of right as his goal. That the one necessarily follows from the other can be shown in this way: right is a relationship between one individual and another in respect of things and people; when it is respected it preserves human society and when it is violated it destroys it. For the description of it given in the Digests does not say what right is, but describes it in terms of its practical application.

[2] If therefore our definition correctly embraces both the essence and the purpose of right, and if the goal of any society is the common good of its members, it necessarily follows that the purpose of every right is the common good; and it is impossible that there can be a right which does not aim at the common good. Hence Cicero is correct when he says in the De inventione that laws are always to be interpreted for the benefit of the community.

[3] For if laws are not framed for the benefit of those who are subject to the law, they are laws in name only, but in reality they cannot be laws; for laws must bind men together for their mutual benefit. For this reason Seneca speaks appositely of the law when he says in De quatuor virtutibus that “law is the bond of human society”.

[4] Thus it is clear that whoever has the good of the community as his goal has the achievement of right as his goal. Therefore if the Romans had the good of the community as their goal, it will be true to say that the achievement of right was their goal.

[5] That the Roman people in conquering the world did have the good of which we have spoken as their goal is shown by their deeds, for, having repressed all greed (which is always harmful to the community) and cherishing universal peace and freedom, that holy, dutiful and glorious people can be seen to have disregarded personal advantage in order to promote the public interest for the benefit of mankind. Thus with good reason it was written: “The Roman empire is born of the fountain-head of piety.”

[6] But since it is only through external signs that anything about the intentions of all free agents is revealed to the outside world, and since our arguments must be sought in accordance with our subject matter, as we have already said, it will suffice for our purposes if we discover indubitable signs revealing the intention of the Roman people both in its collegiate bodies and in individual citizens.

[7] As for its collegiate bodies, which seem in some sense to function as a bond between individuals and the community, the sole authority of Cicero in the De officiis is sufficient: “So long as the power of the state was exercised through acts of service and not of oppression, wars were waged either on behalf of our allies or to safeguard our supremacy, and the consequences of wars were mild or else unavoidable; the senate was a haven and a refuge for kings, peoples and nations; both our magistrates and our military chiefs strove to win praise for this above all, for defending the provinces and our allies justly and loyally. Thus ‘protection’ of the world might be a more appropriate term than ‘domination’.” These are Cicero’s words.

[8] As for individuals, I shall proceed with brief sketches. Are they not to be described as having aimed at the common good who strove to increase the public good with toil, with poverty, with exile, with the loss of their children, the loss of their limbs, even the loss of their lives?

[9] Did not the great Cincinnatus leave us a holy example of freely relinquishing his high office when his term came to an end? Taken from his plough to become dictator, as Livy relates, after his victory and his triumph he handed back the sceptre of office to the consuls and went back of his own free will to toil at the plough-handle behind his oxen.

[10] Cicero indeed, arguing against Epicurus in the De fine bonorum, recalls this act of public service approvingly: “And thus our ancestors led the great Cincinnatus from the plough to make him dictator.”

[11] Did not Fabritius give us a lofty example of resisting avarice when, poor as he was, out of loyalty to the republic he scorned the great sum of gold which was offered him – scorned it and spurned it with disdain, uttering words in keeping with his character? The memory of this incident too is confirmed by our poet in his sixth book when he said:Fabritius, a great man in his poverty.

[12] Did not Camillus give us a memorable example of putting the law before personal advantage? Condemned to exile, according to Livy, after he had freed his besieged country and returned the Roman spoils to Rome, he left the holy city although the whole populace clamoured against his going, and he did not return until permission to come back to Rome was brought to him by authority of the senate. And our poet commends this great spirit in his sixth book when he says:Camillus bringing back the standards.

[13] Did not the first Brutus teach us that not just all other people but our own children must take second place to freedom of the fatherland? Livy says that when he was consul he condemned his own sons to death for conspiring with the enemy. His glory lives on in our poet’s sixth book when he says of him:In fair freedom’s nameThe father condemned to death his own two sonsPlotting new wars.

[14] What did Mutius not teach us to dare for the fatherland when he attacked Porsenna, who was off his guard, and then watched his own hand which had missed its mark burn in the fire with the same expression on his face as if he saw an enemy being tortured? Even Livy expresses amazement as he reports this incident.

[15] Now add to their number those most holy victims, the Decii, who laid down their lives dedicated to the salvation of the community, as Livy relates to their glory, not in terms worthy of them but as best he can; and that sacrifice (words cannot express it) of the most stern guardian of liberty, Marcus Cato. The former for the deliverance of their fatherland did not recoil from the shadows of death; the latter, in order to set the world afire with love of freedom, showed the value of freedom when he preferred to die a free man rather than remain alive without freedom.

[16] The great renown of all these men lives on in the words of Cicero. For Cicero says this of the Decii in the De fine bonorum: “When Publius Decius, first in that family to be consul, offered himself up and charged on his horse at full speed into the thick of the Latin ranks, surely he had no thought of personal pleasure, or where or when he might seize it; for he knew that he was about to die, and sought out death with more passionate eagerness than Epicurus thinks we should devote to seeking pleasure. But had this action of his not been praised with good reason, his son would not have imitated it in his fourth consulship; nor would his son’s son in his turn, when he was consul in the war against Pyrrhus, have fallen in battle and offered himself to the state as the third victim from succeeding generations of the same family.”

[17] In the De officiis he says of Cato: “For the situation of Marcus Cato was no different from that of the others who surrendered to Caesar in Africa. Yet if the others had killed themselves it would perhaps have been accounted a fault in them, because their lives were less austere and their habits more relaxed; but since nature had bestowed on Cato an austerity beyond belief, and he had strengthened it with unfailing constancy, and had always persisted in any resolve or plan he had undertaken, it was fitting that he should die rather than set eyes on the face of the tyrant.”

[18] Thus two things have been explained; the first is that whoever has the good of the community as his goal has the achievement of right as his goal; the other is that the Roman people in conquering the world had the public good as their goal.

[19] Now it may be argued for our purposes as follows: whoever has right as his goal proceeds with right; the Roman people subjecting the world to its rule had right as its goal, as has been clearly demonstrated by what has been said already in this chapter; therefore the Roman people subjecting the world to its rule did this in accordance with right, and as a consequence took upon itself the dignity of empire by right.

[20] For this conclusion to be inferred from premisses which are all clear, the following statement must be clarified: that whoever has right as his goal proceeds with right. To clarify this it must be borne in mind that each and every thing exists for some purpose; otherwise it would be useless, which is not possible, as we said earlier.

[21] And in the same way that each thing exists for its own particular purpose, so too each purpose has some thing of which it is the purpose; and so it is impossible strictly speaking for any two things, in so far as they are two, to have the same purpose; for the same inadmissible conclusion would follow, i.e. that one of them would exist in vain.

[22] Now since there exists a purpose of right – as we have already explained – then having postulated the purpose it becomes necessary to postulate right, since the purpose is an intrinsic and necessary effect of right. And since in any relationship of consequentiality it is impossible to have the antecedent without the consequent, as for example one cannot have ‘man’ without ‘animal’ – as is clear if one affirms the first while denying the second – it is impossible to seek the purpose of right without right, since each and every thing is related to its own particular purpose as consequent is to antecedent; e.g. it is impossible to have a healthy condition of the limbs without having good health.

[23] From this it is quite apparent that one who seeks the purpose of right must seek it with right; nor is this invalidated by the objection which is customarily based on Aristotle’s words where he discusses ‘eubulia’. For Aristotle says: “Yet it is possible to attain even good by a false syllogism: to attain what one ought, but not by the right means, the middle term being false.”

[24] For if a true conclusion is in some way arrived at from false premisses, this happens by accident, inasmuch as the truth is introduced in the words of the conclusion; for in itself truth never follows from false premisses, but words expressing truth may well follow from words which express falsehood.

[25] And the same is true in actions; for although the thief may help the poor man with the proceeds of his thieving, nonetheless we cannot call this alms-giving, although it is an action which would be alms-giving if it were done with his own property.

[26] The same is true of the purpose of right, because if anything were to be obtained as the purpose of this right but without right, that thing would be the purpose of right (i.e. the common good) in the same way as the giving of stolen goods is alms-giving; and so, since in our proposition we are speaking of the purpose of right as it really is, not just as it appears to be, the objection has no force. The point we were inquiring into is thus quite clear.